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Abstract The relationship between abstract formal procedures and the activities of actual physical 
systems has proved to be surprisingly subtle and controversial, and there are a number of competing 
accounts of when a physical system can be properly said to implement a mathematical formalism and 
hence perform a computation. I defend an account wherein computational descriptions of physical 
systems  are high-level normative interpretations motivated by our pragmatic concerns. Furthermore, 
the criteria of utility and success vary according to our diverse purposes and pragmatic goals. Hence 
there is no independent or uniform fact to the matter, and I advance the ‘anti-realist’ conclusion that 
computational descriptions of physical systems are not founded upon deep ontological distinctions, 
but rather upon interest-relative human conventions.  Hence physical computation is a ‘conventional’ 
rather than a ‘natural’ kind.  
 
1     Introduction 
 
What is computation? There are two basic ways to look at the issue:  1) in theory, as a type of 
mathematical ‘process’ – as something that belongs to a purely abstract and formal domain, 
like topology, set theory or real analysis; and 2) in practice, as the activity of certain physical 
systems − as what computers do, where a computer is a concrete device that exists in actual 
space and time. The connection between these two perspectives is generally conceived to lie 
in the implementation relation: a physical system or device performs a computation when it 
‘implements’ or ‘realizes’ a particular abstract formalism. However, specifying the criteria 
under which the implementation relation properly obtains has proved surprisingly subtle and 
controversial, and there are a number of opposing views on the constraints that must be 
satisfied in order for a physical system to count as a ‘genuine’ implementation. 
 
2     A Simple Mapping Account 
 
A very straightforward and elegant account articulated by Putnam (1988) and others is based 
on a simple mapping between physical structure and abstract formalism. Accordingly, a 
physical system P performs a computation C just in case there is a mapping from the actual 
physical states of P to the abstract computational states of C, such that the transitions between 
physical states reflect the abstract state transitions as specified by the mapping. The 
minimalism, neutrality and generality of the Simple Mapping Account (henceforth SMA, 
adopting the terminology of Piccinini 2015a) make it a natural choice as the in-principle 
standard for physical implementation − it takes the Mathematical Theory of Computation 
(MTC) as its starting point and adds no substantial assumptions. And because it adds no 
further assumptions or restrictions, SMA is in an important sense maximally liberal ‒ there 
will exist abstract mappings from a huge class of physical systems and processes to an 
equally huge class of computational formalisms. 
 And there is a clear sense in which this is a significant theoretical virtue. It is standard 
practice in computer science to apply computational descriptions to various physical systems 
at will, simply on the condition that the mapping yields an interesting or useful perspective. 
For example, simple physical devices such as parking ticket dispensers or traffic light 
controllers can be modelled in terms of Finite State Machines, without any reference to the 
original intentions of their designers nor to the actual details of their internal causal structure. 
In such cases, computational ascriptions constitute an idealized depiction, one that abstracts 
away from many actual features of the device to yield a simplified formal model of selected 
aspects of the device. This is quite analogous to applying mathematical formalisms such as 
differential equations to various physical systems to characterize aspects of their trajectories 
through state space. In both cases, the mapping from physical phenomena to mathematical 
formalism is highly reliant on both idealization and approximation, and deliberately neglects 
many aspects of the internal causal mechanisms. 
 In this type of endeavor, which aspects of the system are selected for abstract 
modelling is not fundamental to the system per se, but instead remains a question of human 
choice relative to our interests and goals. There are any number of different perspectives and 
levels for describing the very same system, and none of them is privileged.  A traditional 
spring-driven analogue clock can be formally modelled at various microphysical levels ‒ at a 
subatomic level in terms of quantum mechanical processes and interactions, and at a higher 
microphysical level in terms of molecular thermodynamics. In the latter case, it could also be 
described in more abstract functional terms as a temperature detector, where the mean 
molecular kinetic energy of its metallic components tracks the ambient atmospheric 
temperature.  And it can be described and modelled at various macrophysical levels as well, 
such as an intricate classical mechanism with states evolving in accord with continuous real 
valued equations. It could also be described in more idealized conventional terms, where 
certain selected continuous features are broken into discrete segments and given a 
chronological interpretation. And yet again, this relatively advanced design level stance could 
be ignored, and the object could be given a more rudimentary functional depiction, e.g. where 
its size and inertial properties make it useful as a doorstop.     
 For computation to remain an unfettered, and maximally adaptable mathematical tool, 
like set theory or topology, it is requisite that no fixed or preconceived limits be placed upon 
its potential range of physical interpretation.  And indeed, SMA exemplifies this neutrality 
and universality with respect to the possible relations between abstract formal structure and 
'concrete' physical phenomena. In this vein, Putnam (1988) gives a technical proof of the 
theorem that every open physical system implements every (inputless) Finite State Machine 
(FSM). He provides a generic depiction of a physical system as a bounded, continuous region 
of space-time, and the basic idea is that the region is held constant but sliced up in an as many 
different ways as one likes in order to define a sequence of disjunctive ‘physical states’ that 
can be mapped to any given run of a FSM. 
 And Searle famously promulgates the universality of SMA with the claim that 
virtually any physical system can be interpreted as implementing virtually any formal 
procedure. For example, Searle (1990) asserts that the molecules in his wall could be 
interpreted as running the WordStar program. The claim is simply put forward with no 
further defense, but Copeland (1996) provides a proof of what he calls 'Searle's Theorem', 
which he observes is essentially a notational variant of Newman's (1928) objection to Russell 
(although Copeland then goes on to reject SMA) .  
 This broad-minded position on physical computation arises as the natural inverse of 
the standard and uncontroversial view that abstract formal procedures, as such, are multiply 
realizable.  It’s clearly possible to implement the very same computational formalism using 
vastly different arrangements of mass/energy. Following notation and terminology introduced 
in Schweizer (2012), let us call this top-down feature ‘downward multiple realizability', 
wherein, for any given formal procedure, this same abstract formalism can be implemented 
via an arbitrarily large number of distinct types of physical systems. And let us denote this 
type of downward multiple realizability as ‘↓MR’. The basic perspective advocated by 
Putnam and Searle then goes in the reverse direction. Let us call the bottom-up view that any 
given physical system can be interpreted as implementing an indeterminately large number of 
different computational formalisms ‘upward MR’ and denote it as ‘↑MR’. The basic import 
of ↑MR is the non-uniqueness of computational ascriptions to particular configurations of 
mass/energy. In the extreme versions of ↑MR propounded by Putnam and Searle, it is not 
simply a case of non-uniqueness, but rather there are apparently no significant constraints at 
all – it is held to be possible to interpret virtually any open physical system as realizing 
virtually every computational procedure. Let us call this more extreme version ‘universal 
upward MR’ and denote it as ‘↑MR*’. ↑MR* is noteworthy in that it provides the theoretical 
limit case in terms of abstraction away from physical specifics or limitations, and in this 
sense is comparable to the idea that, e.g., any physical object can be an element in a limitless 
number of distinct sets. 
 
3   The Computational Stance 
 
Many philosophers have found the degree of liberality induced by SMA objectionable. 
Historically, these objections stem from the conflict between critics versus proponents of the 
Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Critics of CTM have used SMA to argue that a 
computational approach to the mind is empirically vacuous. These ‘trivialization’ arguments 
hold that, a la ↑MR*, a mapping will obtain between virtually any physical system and 
virtually any formalism, which in turn is construed as fatally undermining CTM, since 
whatever computational procedures are held to account for our cognitive attributes will also 
be realized by a myriad of other ‘deviant’ physical systems, such as buckets of water and 
possibly even stones. Hence by CTM it would seem to follow that such obviously insentient 
systems have the same cognitive attributes that we do, which is then taken as a reductio ad 
absurdum disproof of CTM. 
 In response to ↑MR* and the associated trivialization claims, a host of authors, 
including Fodor (1981), Maudlin (1989), Chrisley (1994), Chalmers (1996), Copeland 
(1996), Shagrir (2001), Block (2002), Sprevak (2010), Milkowski (2013), Rescorla (2014), 
Piccinini (2015b) advocate additional constraints on the implementation relation, so that it is 
no longer a ‘simple’ or theoretically neutral mapping. In effect, these restrictions serve to 
preclude a vast number of physical systems from the domain of the mapping function, in an 
attempt to separate ‘true’ or ‘genuine’ implementations from the many presumably ‘false’ 
cases countenanced by SMA. These constraints include: causal, counterfactual, semantic, and 
mechanistic/functional criteria. 
 However, I advance quite a different type of response to the situation. First, instead of 
attempting to ‘save’ CTM by constraining the account of physical implementation, I hold that 
SMA does not actually constitute a threat to scientifically plausible versions of CTM. No one 
thinks that SMA ‘threatens’ electrical engineering or our ability to design and utilize 
sophisticated computational artifacts, and in my view, the particular version of CTM that is 
undermined by SMA is not one that should be accepted in any case. Second, I argue that none 
of the proposed constraints provides a truly general and satisfactory 'realist' account of 
physical implementation ‒ indeed, none succeeds at providing a globally applicable  
necessary condition. So I advocate retaining a very liberal SMA view of physical 
implementation, that derives from the basic insights of Turing, Kripke, Putnam and Searle, 
while rejecting the standard anti-CTM conclusion of the trivialization arguments.  
 In line with SMA and ↑MR, I argue that computation is not an ‘intrinsic’ property of 
physical systems, in the sense that (a) it is founded on an observer-dependent act of 
ascription, upon an entirely conventional correlation between physical structure and abstract 
formalism. Furthermore, (b) this conventional mapping is essentially prescriptive in nature, 
and hence projects an outside normative standard onto the activities of a purely physical 
device. In this manner we adopt what could be termed  a ‘Computational Stance’ towards 
physical systems. This approach is in some ways comparable to Dennett's (1981) Intentional 
Stance, wherein intentional states such as beliefs and desires are not posited as objectively 
real phenomena. Instead, they are treated as mere ‘calculational devices’ or  ‘abstracta’ in 
Reichenbach's sense (like point masses and perfectly frictionless surfaces in classical 
mechanics), used to predict observable events but without any additional ontological 
commitments. 
 Analogously, I would construe abstract computational states on a similar footing. In 
the case of our purpose-built artifacts, these abstract states are idealized formal notions that 
we employ to describe such devices from a higher design-level perspective. Classic digital 
computation is rule-governed syntax manipulation, and as such is no more intrinsic to 
physical configurations than is syntax itself. Furthermore, discrete states are themselves 
idealizations, since the physical processes that we interpret as performing digital 
computations are continuous (in the standard non-quantum case). Thus discrete states do not 
literally correspond to the underlying causal substrate. We must abstract away from the 
continuity of actual physical processes and impose a scheme of conventional demarcations to 
attain values that we can then interpret as discrete. Hence this elemental building block of 
digital procedures must be projected onto the natural order from the very beginning (as 
Turing observed in 1950), and in this respect is a convenient fiction rather than a literal 
depiction..  
 Dennett holds that there is no internal matter of fact distinguishing systems that 
'really' possess intentional states from those which do not ‒ the strategy only requires us to 
view the system as if it possessed such states. Hence there is nothing in principle to stop one 
from depicting a stone as an intentional system if one so chooses. In a similar vein, I would 
argue that there is no deep or metaphysically grounded fact regarding whether or not a 
physical system 'really' implements a given computational formalism. In the case of artifacts 
such as my desk top computer, I can gain a huge increase in the ability to predict its future 
states if I adopt a computational stance as opposed to viewing it as a brute physical 
mechanism. And this is because it has been designed and constructed for exactly this purpose, 
just as an electric toaster has been designed and constructed to perform a particular function. 
In contrast, a stone has not been so designed, and the pragmatic value of viewing it in 
computational terms will be rather limited. 
 
4   Critique of the Causal Account  
I will now critically address some of the proposed constraints on SMA, with the aim of 
showing that none provides a principled necessary condition for physical computation. The 
causal account supplies one of the most natural and intuitively compelling constraints on the 
implementation relation. Chalmers (1996), for example, contends that it is a necessary 
condition that the pattern of abstract state transitions must be the image under the mapping of 
an appropriate transition of physical states of the machine, where the relation between 
succeeding physical states in this sequence is governed by proper causal regularities. 
Furthermore, these regularities are supposed to ‘mirror’ the structure of the abstract 
formalism. The imposition of such a constraint will screen off a vast number of Putnam’s 
sequences of physical states, with the aim of reducing the domain of the mapping function to 
a tiny subset of purportedly ‘legitimate’ cases of implementation.  
 However, I argue that the causal constraint is too stringent in general and rules out a 
significant number of cases which should not be excluded. And although it's a more 
specialized and sophisticated approach, the mechanistic/functional  account shares some key 
features with the causal, so many of the following criticisms carry over to this account as 
well. A basic problem with causal and mechanistic approaches is that they place emphasis on 
the wrong level of conceptual analysis. Rather than addressing the question of whether or not 
a given configuration of mass/energy implements a given computational formalism, causal 
considerations instead address the lower level and divergent practical question of how, in 
certain circumstances and over limited spans of time, this implementational sequence is 
mechanically generated.   
 The inessential status of causal structure can be elucidated with the observation that 
the key factor in judging that a given configuration of mass/energy implements a particular 
computational formalism is simply because, according to our abstract blueprint, the correct 
series of physical state transitions actually occurs. As an exemplary case of where appeal to 
causal regularities is completely irrelevant to determining whether or not a given sequence of 
states counts as an implementation, consider Turing's original (1936) heuristics, where the 
paradigm of actualized computation is a human computor, meticulously following a program 
of instructions and executing computations by hand with pencil and paper. In this seminal 
and classic example of concrete realization, the transitions from one state to the next are not 
governed by causal regularities in any straightforward mechanical sense. When I take a table 
of instructions specifying a particular abstract TM and perform a computation on some input 
by sketching the configuration of the tape and read/write head at each step in the sequence, 
the transitions sketched on the paper are not themselves causally connected: as in the virtual 
machine states in standard computers, one sketch in the sequence in no way causes the next 
to occur. 
 In terms of the ‘causal’ factors underpinning their occurrence, it is primarily through 
my understanding of the instructions and intentional choice to execute the procedure that the 
next stage in the sequence appears. But my complex behaviour as a human agent deliberately 
following instructions is not something that we currently have any hope of being able to 
recast in terms of causal regularities at the purely physical level of description. Furthermore, 
whatever causal factors at this level do ultimately underwrite my ability to execute the 
procedure, they will be exceedingly convoluted and indirect, and there is no reason to believe 
that they will ‘mirror’ (or even remotely resemble) the structure of the formalism.  In cases of 
intentionally mediated causation, we accept the sequence of configurations on the paper as an 
implementation of the program, not because we have the faintest idea of the underlying 
causal story, but rather because the sequence itself is correct and can be seen to follow the 
procedural rules. In other words, the projected mapping, a la SMA, has been preserved. 
 To continue the example, consider the following 3 state Turing machine M given by 
the four quadruples:  
                q11Rq1    q101q2  q21Lq2   q20Rq3 
 
The first element in each quadruple (e.g. q1 in the first case) is the current state, the second 
element is the currently scanned symbol (either 1 or 0) the third element is the overt action 
(move R or L one square, or print a 1 or a 0), and  the last element is the covert ‘act’ of 
entering the next state. Now suppose I’m confronted with an initial tape configuration  
                                   01100…            (all other squares to the right are blank).                     
 
Armed with the foregoing explication of the quadruple notation, along with a few basic 
operational conventions (as described in Boolos and Jeffrey 1989), I can act as a perfectly 
good human computor and manifest a physical implementation of the respective Turing 
machine computation. With pencil and paper I can perform the sequence of 6 transitions 
determined by the input configuration and then halt. Indeed, I've now keyed into the digital 
file generating this document the very same sequence  that I sketched in my notebook, and 
have thus produced an alternate physical realization of the same computation. The machine 
starts in its lowest numbered state reading the leftmost non-blank square (where the contents 
of a square are indicated by the corresponding digit in the tape string). An underline indicates 
the currently scanned square, and the number below this indicates the current state. The 
machine halts when it enters a state for which there is no instruction. 
                  q11Rq1; q101q2; q21Lq2; q20Rq3         on input    01100…   
 
                  Start                        01100… 
                                                  1   
                                                  01100… 
                                                      1   
                                                 
                                                  01100… 
                                                        1 
                                                  01110… 
                                                        2 
                                                  01110… 
                                                      2  
                                                  01110… 
                                                    2 
                                                  01110… 
                                                  2  
                                                  01110…       Halt 
                                                    3 
 
 It’s important to note that the foregoing sequence of configurations is not just a 
linguistic description of a possible physical implementation. Instead, the actual syntactic 
tokens are themselves concrete realizations extended in physical space-time. Manipulating 
syntactic tokens on piece of paper is a transformation of the physical environment that itself 
constitutes a realization of the abstract formalism. And the same is true of the sequence of  
symbols generated above ‒ it's a physical implementation of the abstract TM computation 
generated by Microsoft Word.  
 But what is the causal structure underling the Microsoft implementation? It doesn’t 
really matter. The entries in this sequence bear no decipherable causal relations to each other 
– they’re simply generated by what is stored in the digital file that is stored in the computer 
connected to the monitor. The actual computation in space-time appearing as I type is a 
sequence of illuminated patterns projected onto the screen, not supported by any causal 
regularities that 'mirror' the structure of the Turing machine program. It's surely true that 
every event must have a cause, but my point is that surface inspection alone reveals that this 
sequence is a proper realization of the specified TM program on input 01100… To arrive at 
the judgement, we do not need to know anything about the causal mechanisms whereby this 
sequence was produced. 
 And what is the semantic interpretation of the Microsoft implementation? Again, it 
doesn’t really matter. The computation itself is comprised of rule governed syntactic 
transformations. How these transformations are then semantically construed is superfluous to 
the execution of the program. If we choose, we can interpret M's activity as computing the 
function f(x) = x+1 on positive integers expressed in monadic notation (and which halts on 
the same square at which it starts), so that the foregoing sequence of configurations is a 
computation of  f(2) = 2+1 = 3. However, this is clearly not essential to the formal procedure 
itself. 
 And what would have happened if a different input string had been attempted? Again, 
it doesn’t really matter. What matters is that, in accord with the formal procedure, the 
foregoing sequence is correct – it satisfies the essential normative specification as a series of 
rule governed transformations on the input specified.  
 
5  Implementation as Proof in First-order Logic 
 
Each quadruple in the TM program can be seen as a conditional instruction, so that, e.g., the 
first quadruple is the conditional: if in state q1 reading a 1, then print a 0 and enter state q1. 
Hence it is the logical form of the if-then statement that captures the significance of the TM 
instruction, and this is all that must be satisfied by an implementation. Again, this is a 
quintessentially normative constraint, and it's a basic fact of logic that the truth-functional 
character of the material conditional does not imply any causal connection between 
antecedent and consequent. 
 This same fundamental point is made even more graphic by noting that Turing 
machine computations can be formalized in first-order logic with identity (FOL=). Each 
quadruple instruction can be rendered as a universally quantified conditional indicating the 
result of executing the instruction. In providing the details of the formalization, our object 
language L for FOL= will contain the symbols o and ′ as distinguished vocabulary items, 
where o is a singular constant that, under the intended interpretation I, denotes the number 0, 
and where ′ is a 1-place function symbol which under I denotes the successor function. With 
these resources we can construct canonical numerals intended to denote numbers in the 
obvious fashion, e.g., where o′ is the numeral for the number 1, o′′ the numeral for 2, etc.   
 In order to formalize the very simple machine M depicted above, we can make do 
with the assumption that the operant squares are unbounded only to the right. Furthermore, a 
blank square is construed as containing the symbol '0', and only finitely many squares are 
ever non-blank (i.e. contain the symbol '1'). To begin the formalization, let all the operant 
squares of the tape be labelled by a natural number, with the leftmost such square labelled 
with 0, the next with 1, etc.  (the labelling number is distinct from the symbol occurring in the 
square). We adopt the convention that the positive integer input is expressed in monadic 
notation, with the leftmost '1' occurring in square number 1. At the start of the computation, 
all non-input squares of the tape are blank, and the machine starts in state 1 reading square 1. 
 Let t be the ‘time’ variable ranging over steps in the computation. We need two final 
FOL vocabulary items: for each state qi of a given machine, pick a 2-place predicate Qi . For 
each symbol Sj the machine can read/write, pick a 2-place predicate Sj (in this case there are 
only two). The domian D of the intended interpretation I is the set of natural numbers, and 
tQix is true in I iff at time t M is in state qi scanning square number x, and tSjx is true in I iff 
at time t the symbol Sj is in square number x. With these details in place we can now proceed 
to formalize M's program of instructions. 
  
The first quadruple q11Rq1 is rendered as the ‘axiom’ A1 
                          ∀t∀x∀y[(tQ1x ˄ tS1x) → (t′Q1x′ ˄ (tS0y → t′S0y ˄ tS1y → t′S1y))] 
 Under the intended interpretation this axiom 'says that' if machine M is in state q1 at time t 
scanning square number x on which the symbol S1 (= 1) occurs, then at time t+1 M is in state 
q1 scanning square x+1, and in all squares the same symbol appears at time t+1as at time t.  
Various authors (including Chalmers 1996 and Copeland 1996) have objected to Putnam's 
proof because it relies on material conditionals, and it is claimed that more powerful 
counterfactual machinery is required to account for possibilities other than the input actually 
given. However, it is significant to note that the above universally quantified conditional 
ranges over all times and all squares in any computation, and hence exhaustively covers all 
relevant possibilities. 
 
 q101q2  is rendered as A2 
∀t∀x∀y[(tQ1x ˄ tS0x) → (t′Q2x ˄ t′S1x ˄ (y ≠ x → (tS0y → t′S0y ˄ tS1y → t′S1y)))] 
     
 q21Lq2   yields  A3 
∀t ∀x ∀y[(tQ2x′ ˄ tS1x′) →  (t′Q2x  ˄ (tS0y → t′S0y ˄ tS1y → t′S1y))] 
      
  q20Rq3      yields  A4 
∀t∀x∀y[(tQ2x ˄ tS0x) → (t′Q3x′ ˄ (tS0y → t′S0y ˄ tS1y → t′S1y))] 
 
The set {A1,A2,A3,A4} formalizes M’s program. 
 
Next two arithmetical axioms are needed to govern the behavior of ′ and <. The first axiom 
says that each integer is the successor of exactly one integer:  A′  
     ∀z∃x(z = x′) ˄ ∀z∀x∀y ((z = x′ ˄ z = y′) → x = y)).  
The axiom governing < states that: A< 
∀x ∀y ∀z (x < y ˄ y < z → x < z) ˄ ∀x ∀y(x′ = y → x < y) ˄ ∀x ∀y(x < y → x ≠ y) (needed for    
                                                                                                    the entailment relation below) 
 
Finally, for the initial configuration with ‘01100’ as starting input  
 (t = 0 in state q1 reading square 1):  A0 
 oQ1o′ ˄ oS1o′ ˄ oS1o′′ ˄ ∀y ((y ≠ o′ ˄ y ≠ o′′) → oS0y)) 
 
Let ∆ = {A1,A2,A3,A4, A′,A<,A0}  
 Now ∆ completely formalizes the ‘actions’ of machine M on input ‘01100’, and each 
step n in the previously sketched sequence of configurations, constituting the computation on 
input ‘01100’, is syntactically encoded by a sentence Tn in FOL=. Furthermore, the sentence 
Tn is logically entailed by ∆.   
 
For t = 1 the sentence T1: 
     o′Q1o′′ ˄ o′S1o′ ˄ o′S1o′′ ˄ ∀y ((y ≠ o′ ˄ y ≠ o′′) → o′S0y)) 
For t = 2 the sentence T2: 
     o′′Q1o′′′ ˄ o′′S1o′ ˄ o′′S1o′′ ˄ o′′S0o′′′ ˄ ∀y ((y ≠ o′ ˄ y ≠ o′′ ˄ y ≠ o′′′) → o′′S0y)) 
For t = 3 the sentence T3: 
     o′′′Q2o′′′ ˄ o′′′S1o′ ˄ o′′′S1o′′ ˄ o′′′S1o′′′ ˄ ∀y ((y ≠ o′ ˄ y ≠ o′′ ˄ y ≠ o′′′) → o′′′S0y))  
                               
                                                              ⁞ 
 
For t = 7 the sentence T7: 
      o′′′′′′′Q3o′˄ o′′′′′′′S1o′ ˄ o′′′′′′′ S1o′′ ˄ o′′′′′′′S1o′′′ ˄ ∀y ((y ≠ o′ ˄ y ≠ o′′  
                                                                                                 ˄ y ≠ o′′′) → o′′′′′′′S0y))  
 
M has no instructions for q3 and hence will halt if it enters this state. So the ‘canonical’ 
Halting Sentence H for this machine is 
               ∃t∃x (tQ3x ˄ tS0x) ˅ ∃t∃x (tQ3x ˄ tS1x) 
and it’s provable (by mathematical induction) that ∆ ⊨ H, since ∆ ⊨ T8 and T8 ⊨ H.  
 Logical entailment is an abstract mathematical relation, but a particular proof is a 
concrete syntactic phenomenon extended in physical space-time. In this manner, the 
foregoing Turing machine computation is equivalent to a proof in FOL=, and any such proof 
carried out with pencil and paper, following the rules of your favorite first-order deductive 
system, counts as a physical implementation of the computation. 
 It seems a very strange and implausible view to maintain that the property of being a 
proof in first-order logic is constrained by underlying causal regularities or mechanistic 
features. Indeed, when I mark student exams in my Introduction to Logic course, 
considerations of underlying causal regularities and biological mechanisms play no role 
whatever in determining whether some sequence of formulas is or is not a proof.  The only 
thing that matters is whether or not the rules have been correctly followed, and this is a purely 
normative consideration.  And since a proof of the relevant sort counts as an implementation 
of a Turing machine computation, it follows that causal regularities likewise have no bearing 
on the status of such implementations. Indeed, part of the reason that underlying causal 
considerations are the wrong level of analysis is that there is no sense in which error or 
malfunction can occur when viewed from this basic physical perspective. This thread will be 
resumed in section 7. 
  The foregoing counterexamples show that causal and mechanistic factors do not 
impose a necessary condition on physical implementation. Instead, the only necessary 
condition is that the intended mapping, a la SMA, is preserved. In particular, we don’t need 
to take into account the mechanics of how this success has been achieved in order to judge 
that it has it has occurred. And indeed, this is directly comparable to other abstract, rule 
governed activities such as chess. A game of chess is constituted by a sequence of moves on a 
geometrically defined board. Like computations, chess games are substrate neutral and can be 
realized in a virtually limitless variety of physical media. Furthermore, in ascertaining 
whether a given sequence is a legitimate game, all we need to know is whether or not each 
move is in accordance with the abstract structural rules of chess. The question of how these 
moves were physically accomplished is entirely irrelevant. Was the white bishop picked up 
and moved with the right hand or the left? Held between thumb and forefinger or thumb and 
index finger. Or perhaps moved by the power of psycho kinesis? Obviously the answer 
makes no difference.  
 
6   Counterfactual Constraints  
 
The counterfactual requirement is aimed at another apparently ‘slack’ feature incorporated by 
Putnam and the SMA, viz. the mapping from formalism to physical system is defined for only 
a single run, and says nothing about what would have happened if a different input had been 
given. And it is objected that this is too weak to satisfy the more rigorous operational notion 
of being a ‘genuine’ realization. However, in response to this quite natural proposal, it is 
worth noting that for a physical system to realize a rich computational formalism with proper 
input and output capacities, such as an abstract TM, this will always be a matter of mere 
approximation. For example, any given physical device will have a finite upper bound on the 
size of input strings it is able to process, its storage capacities will likewise be severely 
limited, and so will its actual running time. In principle there are computations that formal 
TMs can perform which, even given the fastest and most powerful physical devices we could 
imagine, would take longer than the lifespan of our galaxy to execute. Hence even the fastest 
and most powerful physical devices we could envision will still fail to support all the salient 
counterfactuals.  
 So it will never be possible to construct a complete physical realization of an abstract 
TM – the extent to which a concrete device can execute the full counterfactual range of state 
transitions of which the abstract machine is capable will always be a matter of degree. For 
example, consider the exceedingly simple machine M given above. It’s a straightforward 
matter to exhibit particular computations on small inputs. But there is no finite upper bound 
on the size of input strings that this abstract machine can handle. The set of four quadruples 
yields a mathematically well defined and effective procedure for adding one to a monadic 
input string which contains in excess of, say, 10
1000000000000000000000000000
 1's. It's not physically 
possible for any artefact that we could build to carry out computations for such 
astronomically large inputs. Hence no physical implementation of this simple three state TM 
can deal with the full range of possible inputs.  
 So, in general, the class of counterfactual cases on alternative inputs with which a 
physical realization can cope is by necessity limited – not all counterfactual cases will be 
supported by any physical device implementing any TM. And this renders the appeal to 
counterfactuals inescapably ad hoc. The restrictive strategy demands that the mapping be 
able to support counterfactual sequences of transitions on inputs not actually given − but 
precisely how many inputs not actually given? One, two, twenty trillion? For any 
implementation, there will be a finite upper bound on the size of input string it can process, 
and beyond that size there will be infinitely many potential inputs for which it will not be able 
to perform the salient computation.  
 This indicates that there is no clear or principled cut off point demarking ‘genuine’ 
implementations from ‘false’ ones in terms of counterfactuals. As another, more common 
place, illustration of the ad hoc nature of the appeal to counterfactuals, consider a standard 
pocket calculator that can intake numbers up to, say, 6 digits in decimal notion. Is this a 
‘false’ realization of the corresponding algorithm for addition, since it can’t calculate 106 + 
10
6? It’s an approximate instantiation which is nonetheless exceedingly useful for everyday 
sums. It will always be a matter of degree how many counterfactuals can be supported, where 
a single run on one input is the minimal case. Where in principle can the line be drawn after 
that? It’s a matter of our purposes and goals as interpreters and epistemic agents, and is not an 
objective question about the ‘true’ nature of the physical device as an implementation. In 
some cases we might only be interested in the answer for a single input, a single run.  
 In addition, Bishop (2009) has importantly extended the SMA strategy to show that 
any predetermined finite set of counterfactuals can be accommodated on this approach. From 
this I would conclude that the underlying and more general constraint of concern to those 
who would delimit the range of physical implementation is neither causal nor counterfactual. 
Instead, the point to emphasize is that in ↑MR* exercises of this sort, the mapping is entirely 
ex post facto. The abstract procedural ‘trajectory’ is already known and used as the basis for 
interpreting various state transitions in the open system and hence characterizing it as an 
implementation. Hence using this ex post facto tactic, even finite sets of counterfactuals can 
be included. And as emphasized above, our actual computational artefacts are themselves 
only capable of handling finite sets of counterfactuals.  
 For a physical device to successfully ‘perform a computation’ is distinct from ‘fully 
implementing a computational formalism’. Performing a computation is an occurrent series of 
events, an actual sequence of physical state transitions yielding an output value in accord 
with the normative requirements of the mapping. And this can be satisfied in the case of 
computing the value of a single output on a given input. In contrast, fully implementing a 
computational formalism is a much more stringent and hypothetical notion, requiring appeal 
to counterfactuals, and as above, this will only ever obtain as a matter of degree. In light of 
this distinction, it is clearly possible for a physical device to successfully perform a 
computation without instantiating a complete computational formalism, which distinction in 
turn fatally undermines the theoretical force of counterfactuals in attempting to determine 
whether a physical process has 'really' performed a computation.  
 
 
7     Computational Ascriptions are Normative 
 
As mentioned above, part of the reason why underlying causal considerations are the wrong 
level of analysis is that there is no sense in which error or malfunction can occur at this basic 
physical plane. Physical systems, as such, are governed by natural laws, while formal 
systems are intrinsically rule governed.  In the case of our computational artefacts, a system 
governed by natural laws must be deliberately engineered so that it can be interpreted as 
evolving in accordance with a chosen rule governed formal system. 'Obedience' to natural 
law is an essentially descriptive matter and there is no sense in which mistakes or error can be 
involved – such laws cannot be broken, and the time evolution of material systems is wholly 
determined (in the classical case at least) by the regularities in question. On the other hand, 
'obedience' to formal rules is an essentially normative matter, and there is a vital sense in 
which error and malfunction can occur.  
 This normativity has nothing to do with ethical or religious considerations, but simply 
with conventionally imposed norms. Suppose we are playing a game of chess. It's my move 
and it's clear that I'm about to be checkmated by your queen. So I pick up your queen and 
throw it out the window. You object with the exclamation 'You can't do that!' And I reply, 
'What do you mean - I just did'. In this case the physical processes in question are in perfect 
accord with natural law, but have discontinued implementing the norms of chess. Similarly, if 
my desk top machine is dosed with petrol and set on fire while still in operation, the time 
evolution of the hardware will remain in perfect descriptive accord with natural law. 
However, it will very soon fail to comply with the normative requirements of implementing 
Microsoft Word, and serious computational malfunctions will ensue. Being an 
implementation of Microsoft Word is a normative and provisional interpretation of the 
hardware system, which can be withdrawn when something goes ‘wrong’ or when the system 
is disrupted by non-design intended forces − being an implementation of Microsoft Word is 
not intrinsic to the physical structure itself. It is only at a non-intrinsic prescriptive level of 
description that 'breakdowns' can occur, and we characterize these phenomena as 
malfunctions only because our extrinsic ascription has been violated (as in Kripke 1982).  
 Accordingly, I would argue that the status of computation is very different than the 
status of abstract mathematical theories in physics. In physics we are attempting to give a 
fundamental characterization of 'reality', and in principle at least all existent phenomena 
supervene upon this fundamental level. There is no substrate neutrality in this case, and 
instead we are attempting to arrive at a theoretical description of the fixed and given natural 
order. So the mapping from abstract formalism to physical values is not purely conventional 
as with SMA ‒ e.g. the variables are mapped to basic physical magnitudes and not just 
anything we please. And in the mathematical descriptions of basic physical theory there is no 
normativity involved. If the predictions of a particular theory, say Newtonian mechanics, turn 
out to be incorrect in certain cases, we do not say that physical reality has therefore 
'malfunctioned'. Instead we say that Newtonian mechanics is at fault and our mathematical 
description itself is incorrect. 
 Imagine that we take a device intended to compute some given arithmetical function. 
There is always a non-zero probability of error for any algorithm implemented in the physical 
world ‒ files become ‘corrupted’, overheating induces processing ‘faults’, ‘errors’ are 
propagated. Since error is always possible it follows that there is no independent fact of the 
matter regarding which function or algorithm is ‘really’ being computed. Suppose we say that 
the device is computing addition. We confirm this by testing its behaviour on 50 thousand 
inputs and it gives the correct outputs. But unknown to us the device possesses a mechanical 
fault, and when we keep going it gives some ‘wrong’ answers for larger inputs. So which 
function is it really computing − addition with errors, or the actual function in extension that 
corresponds to its physical behaviour? I would say there is no objective fact to the matter. In 
the arithmetical case there's an extra level of attributed abstract computational 'behaviour' 
that is always underdetermined by its actual performance, and which does not supervene 
upon underlying physical microstructure.    
 According to Piccinini (2015b), one of the prime advantages of the mechanistic 
approach is that it can account for cases of miscomputation. In this regard it diverges from a 
purely causal story by invoking normative/functional considerations. However, I would 
respond that these normative standards are not objective features of physical systems per se, 
but rather are purely conventional human interpretations, on the same par with computational 
ascriptions themselves. In the case of artifacts, the mechanistic account must invoke the 
intentions of the human designers in order to characterize error and malfunction. But this 
does not successfully address Kripke's philosophical critique, since the purpose and 
normativity are still entirely in the eye of the human beholder.  
 In the case of biological systems, including brains, the mechanistic account shifts the 
burden of the intentional homunculus onto the ‘purposiveness’ of biological ‘design’. 
According to this type of neo-Darwinian strategy, something has a particular biological 
function if this function was selected in the course of the organism's evolutionary history. In 
the present  discussion there is not sufficient space to offer a sustained critique of this move. 
However, in brief I would argue that the attribution of purpose is again just a subjective 
projection on the part of human theorists, and constitutes a potentially misleading gloss on 
evolutionary processes. The term ‘natural selection’ can suggest that some sort of choice 
mechanism is involved, which can in turn suggest a form of proto-intentionality on the part of 
biology ‒ as if ‘Mother Nature’ literally chooses the most fit to survive. But of course this is 
only a metaphorical take on the fact that possessing some aimlessly mutated trait which just 
happens to constitute an advantage over ones competitors will mechanically cause the 
possessor to propagate more numerously. The actual mechanisms are all straightforwardly 
causal, and there is no real need to invoke anthropomorphic heuristics appealing to purpose 
or design. The operational effect of possessing a randomly generated favorable trait will 
appear as if the trait were ‘selected’, but of course there is no ‘invisible hand’ at work. It may 
be an arch conservative stand in contemporary intellectual culture, but I would still concur 
with Hume that it's a basic conceptual fallacy to try and derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. 
8   Computational Ascriptions Are Interest Relative  
 
I would now like to propose a different perspective on the issue. Rather than distinguishing 
‘true’ from ‘false’ cases of implementation, what the various proposed constraints do instead 
is to go some distance in distinguishing interesting and pragmatically useful implementations 
from the many uninteresting, trivial and useless cases that abound in the space of theoretical 
possibility. It’s certainly true that there is no pragmatic value in most interpretive exercises 
compatible with ↑MR and ↑MR*. Ascribing computational activity to physical systems is 
useful to us only insofar as it supplies informative outputs.  
 So, interesting and useful mappings are such that we can directly read-off something 
that follows from the implemented formalism, but which we didn’t already know in advance 
and explicitly incorporate into the mapping from the start. That’s the incredible value of our 
computational artefacts, and it’s one of the only practical motivation for playing the 
interpretation game in the first place. Hence a crucial difference between our computational 
artefacts and the attributions of formal structure to naturally occurring open systems, as 
employed by ↑MR* exercises, is that the mapping in the latter case is entirely ex post facto 
and thus supplies us with no epistemic gains. The abstract procedural ‘trajectory’ is already 
known and used as the basis for interpreting various state transitions in the open system and 
hence characterizing it as an implementation. In sharp contrast, we can use the intended 
interpretation of our artefacts both to predict their future behaviour, as well as discover 
previously unknown output values automatically.  
 And this is obviously why an engineered correlation obtains between fine-grained 
causal structure and abstract formal structure in the case of our artefacts – we want them to be 
informative and reliable! We also want them to be highly versatile, and this is where 
counterfactual considerations can come to the fore in practice: over time we do runs on a 
huge number of different inputs, and in principle the future outputs follow as direct 
consequences of the intended interpretation. And this is where semantic considerations can 
enter the picture – the purely syntactic formalisms are designed to preserve truth in our 
intended interpretation, so that from the automated syntactic transformations we can apply 
our interest-relative semantics and hence discover new truths about our chosen semantic 
domain. In general, a particular physical device is useful to us as a computer only when its 
salient states are distinguishable by us with our measuring devices, and when we can put the 
system into a selected initial state to compute the output of our chosen algorithm on a wide 
range of input values. And these features will be relative to our current technological 
capabilities.  
 These pragmatic considerations supply clear and well motivated criteria for 
differentiating useful from useless cases of physical implementation. And I would advocate 
this type of pragmatic taxonomy in lieu of attempts to give overarching theoretical constraints 
purporting to distinguish literally ‘true’ from ‘false’ cases. The pragmatic factors do not 
supply global and uniform necessary conditions (and the ever present non-zero probability of 
error indicates than none is sufficient, either). Different desiderata will have shifting roles and 
prominence in different contexts of application, and will be satisfied to varying degrees 
dependent on the goals and purposes in question, as well as the state of our technological 
progress. Computation is a highly versatile tool, and there is no single and objective class of 
phenomena that can be isolated as comprising the ‘real’ instances of physical 
implementation. Instead, SMA specifies the maximal and context neutral space of 
possibilities, and varying pragmatic considerations can then be applied to carve out different 
subsets within this space which prove useful or interesting according to our divergent human 
purposes. In short, physical computation is not a natural kind ‒ it is founded upon human 
convention, interpretation and choice.   
 
9       Some Standard Objections 
 
I will end the paper by briefly addressing some objections that often arise in response to this 
position.  
 
9.1      The Spectre of Pancomputationalism 
 
In his excellent and illuminating Stanford Encyclopedia article, Piccinini (2015a) observes 
that one of the motivations for rejecting SMA is that it induces ‘unlimited 
pancomputationalism’, which is presumably something we should wish to avoid. But it's 
difficult to see why this type of pancomputationalism should constitute a theoretical menace, 
since it goes hand in hand with anti-realism about physical computation, and simply implies 
that any number of abstract mappings exist in a purely mathematical sense. Analogously, 
there are any number of abstract mappings that exist from the set of positive integers to 
collections of physical objects and particles. For example, the set of O2 molecules in some 
arbitrarily delimited region of the atmosphere is enumerated via some function on the 
positive integers.  And this region can be defined as a proper subset of some other region and 
the same molecules are enumerated by any number of different functions. Hence the same 
molecules can be members of arbitrarily many different sets and images under many different 
mappings.  Is this a threat? For the most part we don't care about all these possible sets and 
enumerations. But in some cases we do, as in the set of human beings living in some country, 
when it comes time to do a census. 
 
9.2      The Threat to CTM 
 
I endorse a purely formal and non-intrinsic account of computation, and consequently argue 
that the mathematical theory of computation alone is not sufficient to provide a full 
explanatory theory of particular subject disciplines, such as a computational theory of the 
mind. This is a specialized scientific application that requires many additional resources 
appropriate to the phenomena and subject area under investigation. Computation is an 
extremely powerful and versatile formal tool, that can be applied to a virtually limitless range 
of phenomena. However computation per se has no mystical powers, and merely 
implementing the ‘right’ sort of computational formalism cannot magically transform some 
given arrangement of mass/energy into a mind. On my account, much more is required than 
merely implementing a formal procedure. In particular, the system must be able to do a host 
of complex and sophisticated things within a multifaceted environment. See Schweizer 
(2016) for further discussion.  
 
9.3       Not all Levels of Description are ‘Intrinsic’ from the Perspective of Physics 
There are many levels of description that are not ‘intrinsic’ from the perspective of 
fundamental physics, but are nonetheless perfectly legitimate and scientifically respectable. 
For example, various arrangements of mass/energy configured in such a way as to perform 
some clear biological function, such as ‘being a kidney’. In response, I would argue that the 
attribution of computational structure is crucially disanalogous to cases such as this, which 
still trade on characteristics which are themselves essentially physical in nature. In order to be 
a kidney, a particular assemblage of material stuff must do things with other instances of 
material stuff that are characterized in terms of, e.g. the chemical composition of blood, waste 
products, filtering, etc. There is an objective, observer independent fact of the matter 
regarding whether or not a given configuration of matter performs the chemically specified 
functions required of kidneys, because biological functions are defined in terms of cause and 
effect relations in the physical world, and in stark contrast, computational realizations are not.  
 There is a pronounced difference here between actual versus abstract characteristics 
which makes attributions of computational structure observer dependent in a manner not 
shared by biological functions. The inputs to a computational system are essentially 
'symbolic' rather than physical, where the material implementations of the symbolic or formal 
inputs must be interpreted as such by an outside agent, and where this symbolic interpretation 
is entirely conventional in nature. This marks a prominent discontinuity in levels of 
description.  
 
9.4       There are Objective Constraints if Given an Appropriate Physical Description 
 
Not just anything goes as SMA seems to suggest ‒ there are objective constraints at 
appropriately specified levels of physical description, e.g. circuit theory (see Scheutz 1999). 
And I would agree that, relative to particular design parameters imposed by human engineers, 
in conjunction with known principles of materials science, there can be very tightly 
constrained abstract solutions. SMA does not imply that such mappings are 'arbitrary', and 
surely the impressive success and reliability of our artifacts is not a subjective phenomenon.  
As with Dennett's Intentional Stance, predictive success is an objective criterion. However, to 
the extent that success is achieved, it ultimately rests upon skilled manipulation of the 
physical substrate. And the ever present possibility of error and malfunction indicates that an 
abstract computational description of this (continuous) substrate is still a normative 
idealization and not an 'intrinsic' characterization. There is nothing physically or 
metaphysically privileged about circuit theory as a level of description, and it does not 
preclude alternative characterizations and different computational mappings ascribed to the 
very same physical system. Hence such 'favored' mappings have no impact on the basic SMA 
perspective.  
 
9.5       SMA Cannot Differentiate a Stone From a Sophisticated Computational Artifact 
 
And surely there is a difference, objectors will contend, and hence SMA does not provide a 
satisfactory account of computation in physical systems. To this complaint I would reply that 
the crucial difference is in our ability to manipulate the artifact in order to acquire new 
information. Artifacts are specifically designed and built to satisfy non ex post facto 
mappings ‒ this is why they're so useful and why we pay good money for them. But this 
feature does not ground an ontological distinction between 'real' versus 'spurious' 
implementations. In other cases we appeal to ex post facto methods, as in error checking the 
very same artifacts. And in the case of 'natural computation', if we have a theory concerning 
what computation a given biological system is performing, then we can predict future 
physical states of the system, and also test our theory, by carrying out the computation first 
and then looking to see if it maps to the empirical facts.    
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